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Abstract
We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic proto-
cols. Our approach relies on a formalisation of the protocol in the setting of a probabilistic process
algebra and a notion of process similarity based on weak probabilistic bisimulation. We illustrate
this approach by presenting the analysis of a probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol which allows us
to quantitatively estimate its fairness degree.
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1 Introduction
Security services such as authentication, conﬁdentiality, non-repudiation, etc.
are nowadays crucial to many applications given the growing importance of
open networks. Thus the study of security protocols that guarantee such
services is equally crucial to systems developers and has recently gained a
primary importance in the research activities in computer science. The recent
literature has shown that the consideration of probabilistic elements in such a
study is essential for a more realistic formalisation and analysis of the security
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problem. Most notably, various approaches [16,17,9,4,13] have been proposed
which rely on probabilistic variations of noninterference [12].
In this paper we investigate possible applications of the noninterference
model of security to the analysis of probabilistic protocols. In particular,
we show how an approximate formulation of a probabilistic noninterference
property [3,4] can be used to conduct a quantitative analysis of protocols which
aim at ensuring that property. To this aim we follow an approach introduced
in [1] which is based on the approximate noninterference model of [8]. The
basic idea behind such an approach is to express the security requirement of
the application at hand as an equivalence problem between two appropriately
deﬁned systems (see, e.g., [10,4]). Then the analysis consists essentially of an
equivalence check and an evaluation of the similarity degree between the two
systems in case of non-equivalence.
Formally, the approach we propose is deﬁned in the framework of a prob-
abilistic calculus [4] and a weak probabilistic bisimulation equivalence seman-
tics [5]. In this setting, the noninterference based security property we con-
sider is a probabilistic extension of the Strong Nondeterministic Noninter-
ference property [10], which we simply call Probabilistic Noninterference [3]
(PNI ). Intuitively, PNI compares, from an external observer standpoint, the
view of the system in the absence of adversary interferences and the view of
the system when the adversary interacts with the system. If the equivalence
check is satisﬁed, then an external observer that sees the result of the pro-
tocol run cannot infer whether or not the behaviour of the system has been
altered by the adversary. Otherwise, we estimate the eﬀectiveness of the ad-
versary strategy (i.e., we provide a quantitative estimation of its capability of
revealing its presence to the external observer) by means of a technique intro-
duced in [1] and corresponding to measuring the maximal “distance” between
two non-equivalent processes. This distance is deﬁned in terms of transition
probabilities and gives an estimate of the behavioural diﬀerence of the two
processes. The meaning we attribute to the resulting measure is related to
the number of tests an external observer needs to perform in order to infer
whether or not the behaviour of the system has been altered by the adversary.
A justiﬁcation for this statistical interpretation was given in [3] following the
model introduced in [8].
As a case study, we apply this technique to the analysis of a probabilistic
nonrepudiation protocol [14], which has been previously modeled and analysed
in [2] through the same process algebraic setting considered in this paper. The
novel analysis methodology we propose allows us to calculate a number which
gives an estimate of the fairness of the protocol, i.e. of its security degree.
We also suggest possible variations of the basic approach which may lead to
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ﬁner analyses from which a more precise upper bound can be deduced for the
security degree of the protocol. With respect to [2], we formally provide a
measure of the eﬀectiveness of the most powerful adversary that is able to
violate the security property of interest.
In the following we formally introduce the process algebraic framework
and the approximate noninterference approach to security (Section 2), by de-
scribing the syntax and the semantics of the probabilistic calculus, the weak
probabilistic bisimulation equivalence, the PNI property rephrased in such
a setting, and an approximate version of PNI . Then, we illustrate the case
study (Section 3), by describing the probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol [14]
together with the process algebraic model of an implementation of such a pro-
tocol, on which we quantitatively estimate the security property of interest.
We ﬁnally outline directions for further work in Section 4.
2 Noninterference and Probabilistic Adversary
We base our approach on a notion of approximate noninterference [8] in the
setting of a calculus used in [4] to deﬁne a probabilistic extension of nonde-
terministic noninterference [10]. In this section, we brieﬂy describe such a
calculus, and present deﬁnition of probabilistic noninterference parameterised
by a class A of probabilistic adversaries [3,1] as well as a quantitative approach
to the evaluation of the maximal interference caused by A [1].
2.1 Probabilistic Process Algebra
The probabilistic calculus we consider derives from a simple nondeterministic
process algebra where actions are syntactically divided into input actions and
output actions. Formally, for each visible action type a, we distinguish the
output action a and the input action a∗. Process terms synchronously commu-
nicate with the environment through their inputs and outputs, and perform
internal computations through unobservable actions, termed τ actions.
Probabilities are introduced by adding probabilistic information to the
algebraic operators. The probabilistic model we adopt [7] is a mixture of
the generative and reactive approaches of [11]. In particular, we assume the
internal and output actions behaving as generative actions, i.e. the system
autonomously decides, on the basis of a probability distribution, which inter-
nal/output action will be executed and how to behave after such an event.
On the other hand, we assume the input actions behaving as reactive actions,
i.e. the system reacts internally to the action type, say a, chosen by the envi-
ronment. Then, the choice of the reactive action of type a to be executed is
performed on the basis of a probability distribution associated with the reac-
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tive actions of type a the system can perform. In practice, we see the input
actions as underspeciﬁed, since their execution is guided by the environment
behaviour. The mixed generative-reactive model allows for a representation of
both probabilistic behaviours guided by probability distributions decided by
the system and nondeterministic behaviours due to the possible interactions
of the system with the environment (see, e.g., [6] for more details).
The syntax of the probabilistic process calculus is as follows:
P ::= 0 | π.P |P +p P |P ‖pS P |P\L |P/pa |A.
We use 0 to represent the terminated process (we usually omit it). Action π
is drawn from set Act and can be an internal action τ , an output action a, or
an input action a∗, where a belongs to the set of visible action types AType.
π.P performs the action π with probability 1 and then behaves like P .
The alternative choice operator P +p Q, with p ∈ (0, 1), performs a mixed
probabilistic/nondeterministic choice among the actions of P and Q. More
precisely, P +p Q executes a generative (reactive of type a) action of P with
probability p and a generative (reactive of type a) action of Q with proba-
bility 1 − p. If one process P or Q cannot execute generative (reactive of
type a) actions, P +p Q chooses a generative (reactive of type a) action of the
other process with probability 1. The choice among generative and reactive
actions and among reactive actions of diﬀerent types is purely nondeterminis-
tic. Hence, the parameter that probabilistically guides the choices comes into
play if and only if a probabilistic choice is really to be performed.
The parallel composition operator P ‖pS Q, with p ∈ (0, 1) and S ⊆ AType,
asynchronously performs all the actions of P and Q that do not belong to the
synchronisation set S. Instead, all the actions belonging to S are constrained
to synchronise. In particular, a synchronisation between two actions can occur
if either they are both input actions of the same type a (and the result is an
input action of type a), or one of them is an output action of type a and the
other one is an input action of type a (and the result is an output action of
type a). The probabilistic choice mechanism among the actions of P and Q
is the same as that described for the choice operator. We just point out that
the execution of some actions of P may be prevented in P ‖pS Q because of
the synchronisation rule. Such a restriction imposes a careful calculation of
the probability distribution of the actions of P ‖pS Q that follow the generative
model of probabilities [11]. In order to obtain a probability distribution, we
normalise the probabilities of executing the generative actions of P executable
by P ‖pS Q (similarly for Q). Such an approach is commonly applied when
restricting actions in the generative model of probabilities [11].
The restriction operator P\L prevents the execution of the actions of type
in L ⊆ AType. We omit further discussions about it as P\L can be expressed
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in terms of the parallel operator. Indeed, it is easy to see that P\L corresponds
to process P ‖pL 0, for any choice of parameter p.
The hiding operator P/pa turns actions of type a into actions τ . In particu-
lar, we recall that the reactive actions a∗ of P are governed by their own prob-
ability distribution, while the actions τ of P are governed by the probability
distribution associated with the generative actions enabled by P . Therefore,
when turning actions a∗ into actions τ we must pay attention to the computa-
tion of the probability distribution of the generative actions enabled by P/pa.
To this aim, we use parameter p to express the probability that generative ac-
tions τ obtained by hiding reactive actions a∗ of P are executed with respect
to the generative actions previously enabled by P . In practice, when turn-
ing reactive actions a∗ into actions τ , parameter p probabilistically resolves
the nondeterminism among the reactive actions of type a and the generative
actions. As an example, consider process a∗ +q b (note that the choice is non-
deterministic, i.e. q is not meaningful), and hide the action a∗. The semantics
of process (a∗+q b)/pa is the probabilistic choice τ +
p b, guided by parameter p,
between τ , obtained by hiding a∗, and b. Parameter p of the hiding operator is
not used when hiding generative actions, because in such a case no nondeter-
minism must be resolved. Intuitively, we turn reactive actions into generative
internal actions in order to obtain closed (fully generative) systems from open
systems (i.e. systems enabling reactive choices). To this purpose, the nonde-
terministic choices due to the potential interactions with the environment are
probabilistically resolved by employing parameter p of the hiding operator.
Constants A are used to specify recursive systems. In general, when deﬁn-
ing a process term, we assume a set of constants deﬁning equations of the
form A
def
= P (with P a guarded term [15]) to be given.
In the rest of the paper, we denote by G the set of ﬁnite state, guarded, and
closed terms [15], called processes, generated by the syntax above. Moreover,
we assume p = 1
2
in the case parameter p of a probabilistic operator is omitted.
Now, we brieﬂy introduce the semantics of the calculus [4]. To this pur-
pose, we introduce the following notation: RAct and GAct denote the sets of
input actions and of output and internal actions, respectively; we use the ab-
breviations P
π−−−→ to stand for ∃p ∈]0, 1], P ′ : P π, p−−−→ P ′, denoting that P
can execute action π with probability p and then behave as P ′, and P
G−−−→ ,
with G ⊆ GAct , to stand for ∃a ∈ G : P a−−−→ , that means P can execute a
generative action a ∈ G.
The operational semantics of the probabilistic process algebra is given by
the labeled transition system (G,Act , T ), whose states are process terms and
the transition relation T is the least multiset satisfying the operational rules
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reported in Table 1 and in Table 2. As far as the rules for P +p Q and P ‖pS Q
are concerned, in addition to the reported rules, which refer to the local moves
of the left-hand process P , we also consider the symmetric rules taking into
account the local moves of the right-hand process Q. Such symmetric rules
are obtained by exchanging the roles of terms P and Q in the premises and
by replacing p with 1− p in the label of the derived transitions.
The semantics rules reﬂect the informal presentation of the syntax of the
operators. Here, we describe in detail the restriction mechanism adopted by
the parallel operator, which, as we have seen, uses a normalisation factor in
order to obtain a probability distribution to be associated with the generative
actions enabled by P ‖pS Q. To this purpose, we employ the following notation:
Set GS,Q = {a ∈ AType ∪ {τ} | a ∈ S ∨ (a ∈ S ∧ Q
a∗−−−→ )} contains the
action types not belonging to set S and the action types belonging to S for
which an input action of Q can be performed. In practice, GS,Q determines
which actions can be executed by a process in the context ‖pS Q. Function
νP (GS,Q) : P(AType ∪ {τ}) −→]0, 1] computes the sum of the probabilities of
the generative transitions of P with type in GS,Q. Hence, the value νP (GS,Q)
is used to normalise the probabilities of the generative transitions of P that
are enabled by P ‖pS Q.
To conclude the presentation of the semantics of the calculus, we introduce
a notion of process equivalence based on which we compare the observable be-
haviours of diﬀerent systems. To this aim we need an equivalence relation
that takes into account the observational power of an external observer, i.e.
is able to abstract away from unobservable internal details. In particular, we
consider a probabilistic variant of the weak bisimulation semantics (borrowed
from [5], where fully probabilistic processes are considered). Such a relation,
termed ≈PB, extends the weak bisimulation (≈B) of [15] by replacing the clas-
sical weak transitions of ≈B by the probability of reaching classes of equivalent
states. More precisely, we use a function Prob, such that Prob(P, π, C) de-
notes the aggregate probability of going from P to a term in the class (of
equivalent terms) C by executing an action π, and Prob(P, τ ∗a, C) expresses
the aggregate probability of going from P to a term in the equivalence class
C via sequences of the form τ ∗a (if a = τ) or τ ∗ (if a = τ).
Lemma 2.1 The value of Prob(P, τ ∗a, C) is the minimal non-negative solu-
tion to the equation system⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if a = τ ∧ P ∈ C
∑
Q∈G Prob(P, τ, Q) · Prob(Q, τ ∗, C) if a = τ ∧ P ∈ C∑
Q∈G Prob(P, τ, Q) · Prob(Q, τ ∗a, C) + Prob(P, a, C) if a = τ
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Table 1
Operational semantics (part I)
π.P
π,1−−−→ P
P
a∗,q−−−→ P ′ Q a∗−−−→
P +p Q
a∗,p·q−−−→ P ′
P
a∗,q−−−→ P ′ Q a∗−−−→/
P +p Q
a∗,q−−−→ P ′
P
a,q−−−→ P ′ Q GAct−−−→
P +p Q
a,p·q−−−→ P ′
P
a,q−−−→ P ′ Q GAct−−−→/
P +p Q
a,q−−−→ P ′
P
a∗,q−−−→ P ′ P GAct−−−→
P/pa
τ,p·q−−−→ P ′/pa
P
a∗,q−−−→ P ′ P GAct−−−→/
P/pa
τ,q−−−→ P ′/pa
P
b∗,q−−−→ P ′
P/pa
b∗,q−−−→ P ′/pa
a = b
P
b,q−−−→ P ′ P a∗−−−→
P/pa
b,(1−p)·q
−−−−−−−→P ′/pa
a = b P
a,q−−−→ P ′ P a∗−−−→
P/pa
τ,(1−p)·q
−−−−−−−→P ′/pa
P
b,q−−−→ P ′ P a∗−−−→/
P/pa
b,q−−−→ P ′/pa
a = b P
a,q−−−→ P ′ P a∗−−−→/
P/pa
τ,q−−−→ P ′/pa
P
π,q−−−→ P ′
A
π,q−−−→ P ′
if A
def
= P
As shown in [4], the equation system above has a least solution. We now
are ready to deﬁne the weak probabilistic bisimulation equivalence.
Deﬁnition 2.2 An equivalence relation R ⊆ G × G is a weak probabilistic
bisimulation if and only if, whenever (P,Q) ∈ R, then for all C ∈ G/R:
• Prob(P, τ ∗a, C) = Prob(Q, τ ∗a, C) ∀a ∈ GAct
• Prob(P, a∗, C) = Prob(Q, a∗, C) ∀a∗ ∈ RAct .
Two terms P,Q ∈ G are weakly probabilistically bisimulation equivalent, de-
noted P ≈PB Q, if there exists a weak probabilistic bisimulation R including
the pair (P,Q).
2.2 Approximate Probabilistic Noninterference
A high-level user (High, for short) interferes with a low-level user (Low, for
short) if what High can do is reﬂected on what Low can observe [12]. High
can perform high-level activities only and observe all the interactions between
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Table 2
Operational semantics (part II)
P
a∗,q−−−→ P ′ Q a∗−−−→
P ‖pS Q
a∗,p·q−−−→ P ′ ‖pS Q
a ∈ S P
a∗,q−−−→ P ′ Q a∗−−−→/
P ‖pS Q
a∗,q−−−→ P ′ ‖pS Q
a ∈ S
P
a∗,q−−−→ P ′ Q a∗,q
′
−−−→Q′
P ‖pS Q
a∗,q·q′−−−→ P ′ ‖pS Q′
a ∈ S
P
a,q−−−→ P ′ Q
GS,P−−−→
P ‖pS Q
a,p·q/νP (GS,Q)−−−−−−−−−−−−→P ′ ‖pS Q
a ∈ S
P
a,q−−−→ P ′ Q
GS,P−−−→/
P ‖pS Q
a,q/νP (GS,Q)−−−−−−−−−−−−→P ′ ‖pS Q
a ∈ S
P
a,q−−−→ P ′ Q a∗,q
′
−−−→Q′ Q
GS,P−−−→
P ‖pS Q
a,p·q′·q/νP (GS,Q)−−−−−−−−−−−−→P ′ ‖pS Q′
a ∈ S
P
a,q−−−→ P ′ Q a∗,q
′
−−−→Q′ Q
GS,P−−−→/
P ‖pS Q
a,q′·q/νP (GS,Q)−−−−−−−−−−−−→P ′ ‖pS Q′
a ∈ S
the system and the environment. Low can perform low-level activities only
and is not allowed to directly observe the occurrence of high-level events. In
our setting, what Low can see is not only the logical low-level behaviour of
the system, but also the probability distribution of each low-level activity.
Despite of the absence of a direct communication channel from High to Low,
High may succeed in altering the low-level view of the system, thus passing
information to Low, by interacting with the high-level interface of the system.
In the following we describe a formalisation of noninterference, where High is
considered to be an adversary that tries to maximise the information leakage
from High to Low.
Roughly, the noninterference approach can be described as follows. First,
we derive two models from the considered system, corresponding to two dif-
ferent low-level views of the system, and then we verify the ≈PB based equiva-
lence between such derived models. The choice of the models to be compared
depends on the deﬁnition of the security property. Here, we consider a proba-
bilistic extension [4] of the Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference property
of [10], which we simply call Probabilistic Noninterference [3] (PNI ). Such
a property compares the low-level view of the system without high-level in-
terferences and the low-level view of the system in the presence of high-level
interactions. If such models turn out to be equivalent, then a low-level ob-
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server cannot deduce the behaviour of the high-level user by interacting with
the low-level interface of the system.
Formally, we divide actions into high-level actions and low-level actions,
denoted High and Low , respectively, depending on the nature of the activities
they represent. High and Low are disjoint and form a covering of AType.
Given a process P , we denote with h¯P = hP1 , . . . , h
P
n the sequence (in alpha-
betic order) of types of the high-level actions that syntactically occur in the
action preﬁx operators within P . Then, the application of the security check
to P is as follows. The view of P without high-level operations is modeled
by P\High. The low-level view of P in the presence of high-level interactions
is expressed by the family of processes P/p1
hP1
. . . /pn
hPn
, p1, . . . , pn ∈ (0, 1), where
p¯ = p1, . . . , pn is the sequence of parameters modelling the probability distri-
bution (chosen by High) of the hidden high-level input actions enabled by the
system. We use the abbreviation P/p¯
h¯P
to stand for P/p1
hP1
. . . /pn
hPn
. Finally, the
PNI property can be formalised as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.3 P ∈ PNI ⇔ P\High ≈PB P/p1hP1 . . . /
pn
hPn
∀p1, . . . , pn ∈ (0, 1).
Parameters p1, . . . , pn express the probabilistic adversary that interacts with
the system and tries to maximise the information leakage from High to Low.
The universal quantiﬁcation over all possible sequences p1, . . . , pn ∈ (0, 1)
means that the equivalence check must hold for an inﬁnite number of adver-
saries. In particular, as also shown in [3], the class A of adversaries expressed
by PNI contains active and memoryless high-level users. On the one hand,
they are active as the probabilistic low-level behaviour of the system can be al-
tered when the reactive high-level actions are hidden. On the other hand, they
are memoryless as they cannot alter their strategy depending on the previous
history. Indeed, the probability distribution of the hidden high-level inputs,
modeled by parameters p1, . . . , pn, is chosen a priori and does not change dur-
ing the system execution. If the condition of Deﬁnition 2.3 holds, then the
system does not leak any information from an adversary in A to Low.
We now show how to calculate a quantitative estimate of the maximal
amount of information leakage caused by A in the case the equivalence check
is not satisﬁed. In the following we restrict ourselves to systems that are fully
speciﬁed from the viewpoint of Low. Hence, we assume that the only reactive
actions enabled by the system are high-level actions [1].
The probability of observing an information ﬂow from High to Low can
be estimated by relaxing the behavioural equivalence relation expressed by
≈PB. As we have seen, an information leakage occurs in P whenever, for a
given sequence p¯ chosen by High, for each equivalence relation R ⊆ G × G
including the pair (P\High, P/p¯
h¯P
), there exist C ∈ G/R, a ∈ GAct , and
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a pair (P ′, P ′′) ∈ R, such that Prob(P ′, τ ∗a, C) = Prob(P ′′, τ ∗a, C). The
diﬀerence between these two probabilities can be used to give an estimate
of the amount of information leakage. More precisely, for every equivalence
relation R including the pair (P\High, P/p¯
h¯P
), we consider the pair of states (of
a class in G/R) where the weak transition probabilities are maximally diﬀerent
and calculate the diﬀerence. We can then deﬁne a measure of the security of
P as the minimal of these diﬀerences over all equivalence relations.
Formally, we deﬁne the quantity δRp¯ (P ) (or simply δ
R
p¯ when it is clear from
the context), which expresses the behavioural distance between P\High and
P/p¯
h¯P
with respect to a relation R ⊆ G ×G including the pair (P\High, P/p¯
h¯P
)
and a sequence of parameters p¯ = p1, . . . , pn governing the interactions be-
tween the high-level input actions of P and High. By using this quantity we
then deﬁne a measure εp¯ for the security degree of a system P against the
adversary modeled by p¯.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let P be a process, R ⊆ G × G an equivalence relation in-
cluding the pair (P\High, P/p¯
h¯P
), and p¯ = p1, . . . , pn a sequence of parameters
such that pi ∈ (0, 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We deﬁne
δRp¯ = sup
(P ′, P ′′) ∈ R,
a ∈ GAct , C ∈ G/R
|Prob(P ′, τ ∗a, C)− Prob(P ′′, τ ∗a, C) |
and then
εp¯ = inf R δ
R
p¯ .
Chosen a relation R, δRp¯ expresses the maximal diﬀerence between the low-
level view of the system without high-level actions and the one modelling the
interactions of the system with the high-level user probabilistically modeled
by sequence p¯. Then, the relation that is the best approximation of a weak
probabilistic bisimulation is obtained by computing the minimum (εp¯) over all
the possible δRp¯ . That means, εp¯ expresses how similar are the two low-level
views of the system to be compared [1]. Note that this quantity depends on
parameters p1, . . . , pn forming the sequence p¯, which models an adversary of
the family A deﬁned by PNI . The measure εp¯ can also be interpreted as the
eﬀectiveness of such an adversary [8]. In fact, it determines how easy it is for
a low-level user to obtain some information, in terms of the number of tests
(system executions) Low needs to perform in order to distinguish with success
the behaviours with and without the adversary interferences. The maximal εp¯
obtained by varying p¯, i.e. by changing the adversary strategy, determines the
eﬀectiveness of the most powerful adversary in A. In the following, we will
show that the problem of ﬁnding such an adversary corresponds to solving a
(non-linear) optimisation problem with as many variables as the number of
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parameters contained in the sequence p¯ [1].
3 A Case Study: Probabilistic Nonrepudiation
As an example of application of the methodology surveyed above, in this
section we present a case study: a probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol [14].
Here, we show how the maximal information leakage, expressed in terms of the
maximum probability of violating a fairness property during system execution,
can be estimated.
3.1 An Overview of the Protocol
Repudiation consists of the denial by one of the entities involved in a message
exchange protocol of having participated in all or part of the protocol itself:
nonrepudiation of origin is intended to prevent the originator of a message
from denying having sent the message, and nonrepudiation of receipt is in-
tended to prevent the recipient of a message from denying having received
the message. Especially in e-commerce, nonrepudiation is needed to protect
a transaction against any attempt to repudiate either the payment for the
service or the delivery of the service. Here, we consider a protocol that of-
fers a nonrepudiation service, guaranteed with a certain probability, without
resorting to a trusted third party [14]. Such a protocol oﬀers a fair exchange
of a message, sent by the originator O, which oﬀers a service, for an acknowl-
edgment, sent by the recipient R, which is expected to conﬁrm the received
service. The probabilistic protocol is ε-fair, i.e. at each step of the protocol
run, either both parties receive their expected information, or the probability
that a cheating party gains any valuable information, while the other party
gains nothing, is less than ε.
In the following we suppose that the protocol is preceded by a secure
authentication phase, during which the involved parties exchange their public
keys of a public key cryptosystem. Moreover, we denote by SignE(M) the
message M encrypted with the private key of the entity E, by k a secret key
chosen by O to encrypt a message M with a symmetric encryption algorithm,
and by t a timestamp which each message is enriched with. Finally, R → O :
Msg expresses a message Msg sent by R and received by O.
We now describe an implementation of the protocol illustrated in [14]. The
recipient R starts the protocol by sending a signed, timestamped request for a
service to the originator O, which in turn sends the ﬁrst signed, timestamped
message containing M encrypted with k. Upon receiving the ﬁrst message
from O, R sends a related signed, timestamped acknowledgment message con-
A. Aldini, A. Di Pierro / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 112 (2005) 131–148 141
taining ack1 = (1, R,O, t):
1. R → O : SignR(request, R,O, t)
2. O → R : SignO({M}k, O,R, t)
3. R → O : SignR(ack1).
Then, at each protocol step i, O probabilistically decides whether to continue
the protocol (with probability 1− p), by sending a key k′ diﬀerent from k, or
to terminate the protocol (with probability p), by sending the key k needed
to obtain the plaintext M . On the other hand, for each received message, R
transmits the related ack message acki = (i, R,O, t):
2i. O → R : [p]SignO(k,O,R, t) + [1− p]SignO(k′, O,R, t)
2i + 1. R → O : SignR(acki).
Since R does not know the result of the probabilistic choice, it cannot deter-
mine when the protocol will end and, as a consequence, when it will receive
the ﬁnal message. Upon the reception of the ack related to the last message
containing k, O correctly terminates the protocol. Note that an end of proto-
col message sent by O is not mandatory. Indeed, after not receiving further
messages, R is aware of the protocol state and is able to compute M .
As far as the security guarantees are concerned, each message conveys a
timestamp, which is used to determine the freshness of the message and to
protect the parties against replication attacks. The nonrepudiation of origin is
guaranteed by the messages SignO({M}k, O,R, t) and SignO(k,O,R, t), and
the nonrepudiation of receipt is given by the last message SignR(ackn). If
the protocol terminates after the delivery of SignR(ackn), both parties obtain
their expected information and the protocol is fair. If the protocol terminates
before the transmission of SignO(k,O,R, t), then neither O nor R obtain any
valuable information, so that the fairness is preserved. However, at each step
R could try to verify whether M can be obtained by employing the last key
received from O and, once the correct key k is received, violate the fairness
of the protocol by blocking the transmission of the last ack. Hence, key to
success of the protocol is the immediacy in sending back the ack. Under such
a condition, if the transmission of an ack is delayed by R, then O can detect
this unfair strategy and prematurely stop the protocol. To this aim, the choice
of the encryption algorithm must be in such a way that the decryption of the
ciphertext takes more time than the transmission of an ack. Hence, O decides
a deadline for the reception of each ack, after which, if the ack is not received,
the protocol is stopped. Finally, we observe that such a protocol is exposed to
the attack of a malicious recipient that tries to randomly guess the number of
protocol steps and block the ﬁnal ack. In fact, as we will see, this is the kind
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of attack that we formally analyse in the next sections.
3.2 Modelling the Protocol
The protocol described in Section 3.1 guarantees nonrepudiation of origin with
probability 1 and nonrepudiation of recipient with a probability less than 1.
Hence, our goal is to estimate the probability of violating the nonrepudiation
of recipient. In order to determine the eﬀectiveness of the most powerful
adversary strategy against the originator, we model and analyse the behaviour
of the originator and we consider the recipient as a potential adversary.
In our model, we abstract from the cryptosystem used within the protocol
and we simply describe the packet exchange between the two involved parties.
We also abstract from the channel and the transmission delays, by assuming
that a message which is delayed (not sent) by a participant is not delivered to
the other participant. The speciﬁcation of the originator is as follows:
O
def
= receive request∗.snd msg .receive ack ∗.O
′
O ′
def
= snd msg.O ′′ +p snd msg.O ′′′
O ′′
def
= receive ack ∗.0 + receive stop∗.unfair .0
O ′′′
def
= receive ack ∗.O ′ + receive stop∗.0
At the ﬁrst round of the protocol (term O), the originator is ready to accept an
incoming request, send the ﬁrst message containing {M}k, and then receive the
related ack message. Afterward, at the beginning of each new step (term O ′),
the originator probabilistically decides whether to send with probability p the
last message containing k, thus reaching term O ′′, or to send with probability
1− p a garbage message, thus reaching term O ′′′. In term O ′′′, the originator
waits for the ack before starting another step. The expiration of the timeout is
abstracted through the reception of a message of type receive stop, that means
the protocol is stopped. Note that in this case the protocol execution is fair,
because the ﬁnal message containing k has not been sent yet. In term O ′′,
the originator waits for the last ack. Upon receiving such an ack, the protocol
correctly terminates in a fair way. Otherwise, the protocol terminates in an
unfair way from the viewpoint of the originator. This is signaled by executing
the action of type unfair .
3.3 Measuring the Security of the Protocol
As far as the security analysis is concerned, we make the following assump-
tions. Since the recipient is a potential adversary, we consider all the commu-
nications between the involved parties as high-level actions. Hence, the only
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low-level action is unfair , which reveals to a low-level observer the violation
of the fairness condition.
In Figure 1 we show the labelled transition system associated with the
model of the originator and the two low-level models that, according to the
PNI deﬁnition, must be compared through equivalence checking. In particu-
lar, the former low-level model is obtained by hiding all the high-level actions,
i.e. O/receive ack/receive request/
q
receive stop/snd msg . Note that the parameter of the
hiding operator is not meaningful where we omitted it. Intuitively, by vary-
ing parameter q in the range (0, 1), we model all the possible recipients that
execute the protocol and decide the probability distribution of each message
sent to the originator. The latter low-level model is obtained by restricting the
high-level actions, i.e. O\High. Intuitively, such a model expresses the absence
of the recipient, that means nothing (potentially insecure) happens. We point
out that the class A of adversaries considered by PNI is adequate to reveal
the security degree of the protocol. In particular, a history-dependent strategy
followed by a malicious recipient would not be useful to gain an advantage as
each protocol step does not depend on the previous ones.
If we limit ourselves to an exact veriﬁcation of the security property, we
obtain that PNI does not hold as the condition
O\High ≈PB O/receive ack/receive request/qreceive stop/snd msg ∀q ∈ (0, 1)
is not satisﬁed. The reason is that in the presence of a (potentially malicious)
recipient the action unfair can be observed with a certain probability.
In order to quantitatively estimate the eﬀectiveness of the most powerful
adversary we resort to an approximate analysis. To this aim, we take the low-
level views of the protocol considered by PNI (see Figure 1) and we calculate
the diﬀerence between them for each possible relation R and for each value of
q chosen by the recipient.
We start by considering relation R1 = {{1, 1′, 2, 3, 5}, {4}}, for which we
obtain the following results:
|Prob(1, τ ∗, [4])− Prob(1′, τ ∗, [4]) | = p · q ·∑∞i=0((1− p) · (1− q))i
= p·q
1−(1−p)·(1−q) =
p·q
p+q−p·q ,
|Prob(2, τ ∗, [4])− Prob(1′, τ ∗, [4]) | = (1−q)·p·q
p+q−p·q ,
|Prob(3, τ ∗, [4])− Prob(1′, τ ∗, [4]) | = q,
|Prob(2, τ ∗, [4])− Prob(1, τ ∗, [4]) | = p·q2
p+q−p·q ,
|Prob(3, τ ∗, [4])− Prob(1, τ ∗, [4]) | = q2−p·q2
p+q−p·q ,
|Prob(3, τ ∗, [4])− Prob(2, τ ∗, [4]) | = q2
p+q−p·q .
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Fig. 1. Nonrepudiation protocol speciﬁcation and models to be compared through equivalence
checking.
The same results follow if we consider the sequence τ ∗unfair leading to class
[5]. In order to compute δR1q , we ﬁrst point out that
p
p+q−p·q cannot be greater
than 1 (note that such a quantity corresponds to the probability of reaching
state 3 from state 1 through a sequence τ ∗). Similarly, we have that q
p+q−p·q ≤
1. Therefore, it can be easily veriﬁed that δR1q = q. Note that in the limiting
scenario q = 0 we obtain δR10 = 0, which, obviously, represents the worst
case from the viewpoint of the adversary. Intuitively, in such a case we have
that state 4 is not reachable and the protocol cannot terminate in an unfair
way for the originator. Instead, as q tends to 1 we have that δR1q tends to 1,
because of the diﬀerence between states 1′ (which cannot reach state 4) and 3
(which reaches state 4 with probability q). On the basis of such considerations,
we consider relation R2 = {{1, 1′, 2, 5}, {3}, {4}}, for which we obtain δR2q =
p
p+q−p·q = |Prob(1, τ ∗, [3])− Prob(1′, τ ∗, [3]) |.
We summarise the analysis of further relations as follows. For each relation
R including the pair (1′, 4) it follows δRq = 1. Indeed, from state 1
′ it is not pos-
sible to reach class [5], while state 4 reaches state 5 with probability 1 through
the action unfair . We can argue similarly if (2, 3) ∈ R, since from state 1 we
reach class [2] with probability 1, while from state 1′ we cannot reach class [2].
In the case (2, 4) ∈ R, we have that Prob(4, τ ∗, [5]) = 0, while Prob(2, τ ∗, [5]) >
q, hence δRq > q. In the case C = {3, 4} is a class in G/R, then δRq ≥ pp+q−p·q ,
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since Prob(1, τ ∗, C) = p
p+q−p·q and Prob(1
′, τ ∗, C) = 0. We can argue similarly
for R = {{1, 1′, 5}, {2}, {3}, {4}}. For R = {{1, 1′, 3, 5}, {2}, {4}} we have
δRq ≥ q, since Prob(3, τ ∗, [4]) = q and Prob(1′, τ ∗, [4]) = 0. Finally, for each R
such that {1, 1′} is a class in G/R we can argue as in the previous cases.
Hence, we can conclude that εq = min{δR1q , δR2q } = min{q, pp+q−p·q}. In
particular, we have that εq = q if p ≥ q21−q+q2 , otherwise εq = pp+q−p·q if
p ≤ q2
1−q+q2 . The value of εq expresses how similar can be the process that
does nothing (which, by deﬁnition, is secure) and the process that executes the
protocol with a recipient probabilistically modeled by parameter q. Obviously,
the smaller εq is, the higher the security degree of the protocol. By varying
parameter q, a malicious recipient can try to maximise the diﬀerence between
the two low-level views of the system. Formally, the maximum value of εq
obtained by varying parameter q can be calculated by solving a non-linear
optimisation problem. As shown above, the value of εq strictly depends on
the value of p. Since p is a parameter under the control of the originator, it
can be veriﬁed that the maximal diﬀerence between the two low-level views
of the system can be kept as small as desired by decreasing p. Obviously, the
smaller p is chosen, the longer the duration of the protocol is. Therefore, a
real implementation of the protocol becomes impractical if the participants
require a very small tolerance to violations of the security property.
We now discuss an alternative estimation that is less coarse than that
provided so far. In our approach to probabilistic protocol analysis, high-level
actions model the protocol communication events, while low-level actions are
extra signals that are observed by Low in order to infer the behaviour of the
protocol run. Hence, Low distinguishes between two diﬀerent protocol runs
on the basis of such observations (i.e. the extra signals it can consume) rather
than directly interacting with the protocol entities. That means the distance
between pairs of states depends on the diﬀerence between the probabilities of
the weak transitions of the form τ ∗l, where l is a visible action observed by
Low, i.e. one of the extra signals emitted during the protocol run. Based on
these considerations, we now employ a variant of Deﬁnition 2.4 that replaces
the condition a ∈ GAct by the condition a ∈ GAct − {τ}. For R1, we have
δR1q = q = |Prob(3, τ ∗unfair , [5]) − Prob(1′, τ ∗unfair , [5]) |. For R2, it follows
δR2q =
p·q
p+q−p·q = |Prob(1, τ ∗unfair , [5]) − Prob(1′, τ ∗unfair , [5]) |. Therefore,
δR2q < δ
R1
q . For each other relation R, δ
R
q is greater than (equal to) δ
R2
q .
Therefore, εq =
p·q
p+q−p·q , i.e. εq tends to the limiting value p as q tends to
the limiting value 1. Again, the value of p determines, from the viewpoint of
an external low-level observer, the diﬀerence between the system modelling
the protocol and a secure system. In particular, p represents the maximal
A. Aldini, A. Di Pierro / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 112 (2005) 131–148146
probability of observing an unfair execution, obtained when the adversary
sets q = 1, i.e. the protocol is stopped after the execution of the ﬁrst step.
4 Conclusion
We have applied a formal approach to estimating the security of a system to
a case study, namely a probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol. This approach
allows us to measure the amount of information leakage caused by the prob-
abilistic adversaries of a class A deﬁned by a probabilistic noninterference
property. The quantitative analysis is based on a notion of process similarity
corresponding to an approximate version of the weak probabilistic bisimula-
tion semantics [5]. Such an approximation provides an upper bound ε for
the probability of observing a security violation caused by the most powerful
adversary in A. For a comparison with related work, the reader is referred
to [1].
As we have discussed in Section 3.3, the cost for estimating ε can be re-
duced by considering a restricted set of interesting relations and by discarding
those that cannot contribute to ﬁnd ε. We intend to investigate the eﬀective-
ness of such a strategy since the number of potential relations to be checked
factorially increases as the number of states increases (note that we have to
take all the possible disjoint subsets of states that form a covering of the state
space).
We have discussed an alternative deﬁnition of the quantity ε resulting
from an analysis which takes into account the actual observational power of a
low-level user in our speciﬁc case study. This yields a ﬁner estimation of the
protocol security. We are investigating other alternative deﬁnitions aiming
at more precise estimations of the information leakage. In particular, when
computing the distance between a pair of reachable states it could be useful
for the analysis to take into account also the probability of reaching such
states. For instance, the similarity between the initial states of two processes
to be compared should not have the same weight as the similarity between
two states that are reachable with a negligible probability. Thus, we believe
that including such weights in the calculation of ε will increase the precision
of the resulting estimation.
Finally, as a future work, we intend to apply the approach presented in
this paper to other properties in order to extend the class of probabilistic
adversaries that are considered. Indeed, more powerful adversaries are needed
to reveal a larger spectrum of security problems of probabilistic protocols.
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